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1Anatomy of an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent Distribution in Kuwait 
LAURA EL-KATIRI, BASSAM FATTOUH AND PAUL SEGAL 
Abstract 
Oil wealth has transformed Kuwait within decades from a modest, trade-based desert 
emirate into a modern city-state. It has also created a relatively egalitarian economy 
based on an extensive distributive system that provides Kuwaiti citizens with essential 
services including free healthcare, education and social security. Therefore, the most 
important fact about Kuwait’s oil wealth is that it has been successfully used to benefit 
its citizens. This feat has been achieved through a broad distributive welfare state. 
Nevertheless, Kuwait’s policies of rent distribution have developed in an ad hoc 
manner into an uncoordinated system. Some of Kuwait’s policies of rent distribution, 
such as subsidizing utilities and providing public employment, have resulted in 
substantial distortions, inefficiencies and institutional deficiencies, and thus there 
remains substantial scope for improvement. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Oil has made Kuwait rich. Oil is Kuwait’s largest productive sector by a long way, and oil 
rents are the foundation of even the non-oil economy. But wealth does not lead automatically 
to economic and social development. Kuwait’s achievement is that it has, for the most part, 
used its oil income to provide a high standard of living for full Kuwaiti citizens, while to a 
much lesser extent also benefiting non-Kuwaitis. Oil wealth has transformed the country 
within decades from a modest, trade-based desert emirate into a modern city-state. It has also 
created a relatively egalitarian economy based on an extensive distributive system that 
provides Kuwaiti citizens with essential services including free healthcare, education and 
social security. Therefore, the most important fact about Kuwait’s oil wealth is that it has 
been successfully used to benefit its citizens. This feat has been achieved through a broad 
distributive welfare state, developed over the decades since oil was discovered.  
Nonetheless, Kuwait’s policies of rent distribution have developed in an ad hoc 
manner into an uncoordinated system with substantial distortions, inefficiencies and 
institutional deficiencies. These include the long-term use of subsidies to energy and other 
utilities that lead to inefficient use and misallocation of resources; a highly segmented labour 
market whose ability to absorb large numbers of young Kuwaitis outside the public sector 
remains in doubt; and an uncompetitive and deteriorating business environment that stifles 
private and foreign investment. 
2In our analysis we also note, however, that given Kuwait’s extensive wealth, the 
structure of the economy and productive relations will necessarily look different from those 
in most countries. One therefore has to be careful to distinguish between policies and 
behaviours that are genuinely inefficient or distorting and those – such as low labour force 
participation – that may be a rational response to unearned wealth. 
The main purposes of this paper are to examine the effects of Kuwait’s extensive 
welfare system and identify the various channels of rent distribution that underlie it. 
2. OIL RENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF KUWAIT  
In an economy dominated by natural resources the management of the rents becomes one of 
the most important roles of the government. Here we take the standard economists’ definition 
of rents as payments to a factor of production over and above that required to induce it to do 
its work (Wessel 1967). This definition implies that resource rents are any payments to the 
owner of a natural resource that remain once labour (including highly skilled labour), capital 
(including technology) and any other inputs to the extraction of the resource have been paid.1
In most resource-rich countries these rents accrue to the government. In countries like Kuwait 
in which the modern state apparatus developed after or during the development of the 
resource sector, countries often referred to as rentier economies or rentier states, the 
development of the institutions and policies of the government are heavily influenced by its 
role as the manager and distributor of rents (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi 1987; Karl 1997). 
2.1. Kuwait’s pre-oil economy 
Kuwait’s pre-oil economy was marked by three main features: first, the accumulation of early 
wealth in Kuwait during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through trade and trade-
based activities, largely in the hands of the merchant families; secondly, the political 
stabilization of the emirate of Kuwait under the family of the Al-Sabah, which provided the 
stability needed for successful trade; thirdly, the virtual absence in any form of the welfare 
state known in Kuwait today. 
Kuwait was founded in the early eighteenth century by a group of tribal clans that had 
migrated from the Najd in Saudi Arabia. Owing to its rich coastal waters, its suitability at the 
upper edge of the Western side of the Gulf as a natural harbour, and its strategic location 
 
1 This follows from the definition because there is no opportunity cost to extracting natural resources: since they 
are worth nothing in the ground, any payment left over after extraction counts as rent. 
3between the mainland trade routes between Baghdad and Aleppo, Kuwait soon flourished as 
a trading hub between the East and the West. The economy’s main businesses sectors – land 
trade, seafaring and a lucrative pearl industry – laid the foundations for early wealth creation 
in Kuwait, primarily in the hands of the merchants and trading families of Kuwait (Al-Sabah 
1980: 23; Crystal 1995: 19). Soon known throughout the Gulf region as Kuwait’s powerful 
elite, the merchant families not only dominated economic life, but also constituted an 
important element in the political balance between the amir, the ruler of Kuwait, on the one 
hand, and the ruled on the other (Crystal 1995: 19). 
Prior to the discovery of oil, the amir remained financially dependent on taxes and 
customs duties collected from the population. In the nineteenth century the merchants, as the 
main providers of these funds, exercised a strong influence on policy making under the amir. 
In the early twentieth century as the amir began to benefit from strategic rent paid by the 
British and from the first payments for oil concessions, the merchants sought to reassert their 
influence through a political movement that led to a short period of political confrontation 
and, briefly, to the creation of an elected assembly, the majlis, during the 1930s (Crystal 
1995: 47).2
This period overlapped with a period of economic decline caused by developments 
partly outside Kuwait’s control: the 1920s began with a conflict over trade routes with Saudi 
Arabia, leading to many routes being blocked for much of the decade. The dependence of 
Kuwait’s economy on international trade meant that the emirate was severely hit by the 
global financial crisis of the 1930s. The collapse of the pearl industry in the Persian Gulf 
during this period, a result of a flooding of international markets with cheap mass products 
from East Asia, further compromised the economy. While most of Kuwait’s merchant 
community proved to be resilient to the crisis, those working further down the hierarchy, such 
as pearl divers, boat builders and Bedouin tribes, faced increasing impoverishment (Al-Sabah 
1980: 16–24; Khalaf and Hammoud 1988).  
2.2. Kuwait’s oil economy  
Oil was first discovered in Kuwait in 1938, following a concession agreement between the 
state of Kuwait and Britain that allowed the British to explore and produce from Kuwaiti oil 
 
2 A majlis is a traditional form of assembly usually comprising tribal elders, but in this format also includes 
representatives of leading families, gathering with the amir and discussing policy issues.  
4fields, with production starting in 1948. Kuwait’s oil revenues grew substantially in the 
decades after oil was discovered, rising from US$760 thousand in 1946 to US$567.5 million 
by 1965 and, following the oil price bonanza of the mid-1970s, US$9.8 billion in 1976, the 
equivalent of 2.3 times non-oil GDP, or 70 per cent of total GDP (Khouja and Sadler 1984: 
39; Ismael 1993: 135; authors’ own calculations).3
Kuwait’s oil revenues have always accrued directly to the state.4 Until 1975, the 
mechanism was royalties and taxes on profits paid by foreign oil companies. In 1975, Kuwait 
nationalized the country’s oil industry, and in 1980 placed both the upstream and downstream 
sectors under the control of its national oil company, the Kuwait Petroleum Company. With 
such vast rent income, the state not only became extraordinarily wealthy, but also found itself 
in control of the majority of the economy’s overall output. The removal of most taxes levied 
on the domestic economy since the early 1950s clearly signalled that the basic relation 
between the state and its citizens was no longer one of mutual financial dependence, but one 
defined by the purely distributive role played by the state.  
It became clear soon after the discovery of oil that the state, as the owner and 
distributor of such substantial parts of the economy’s wealth, needed to modify its approach 
to the economy as a whole. In the absence of a central planning department during the 1950s 
and early 1960s, the government began to spend increasing sums on the country’s social and 
economic infrastructure. Kuwait’s first five-year plan, adopted in 1967, defined the state’s 
long-term objectives: first, the diversification of Kuwait’s economy towards a self-sustaining 
growth independent of oil revenues; secondly, ensuring an equitable distribution of income 
among Kuwaitis; and thirdly, the training of Kuwait’s human resource base and the 
development of specialized skills (Ismael 1993: 135).5
As a result of its need to channel rent into the economy following these objectives, the 
role of the state in the economy grew. The mining and quarrying sector, since 1975 entirely 
state-owned, has accounted for more than half of the Kuwaiti economy’s output continuously 
 
3 GDP shares are at domestic prices. 
4 Until the 1962 constitution, the recipient of oil royalties was the amir of Kuwait. This changed with the 
introduction of a written constitution which made Kuwait one of the first countries in the Gulf to declare 
formally that all of the country’s natural resource revenues belonged to the state, rather than the ruler (Kuwaiti 
Constitution, Part 2 Art.21, available at www.kt.com.kw/ba/dostour.htm). 
5 These aims have been reiterated throughout Kuwait’s development plans, the most recent of which was 
adopted in early 2010 (Government of Kuwait 2009). 
5since the 1950s (KASA 2008: 220, Table 139).6 Various industries, such as the refining, 
petrochemicals and fertilizer industries, as well as other economic sectors such as transport 
and logistics, have been highly dependent on the country’s oil sector. In addition, sectors 
such as banking and finance and real estate have benefited from the availability of large sums 
of capital in Kuwait due to oil rents. In this way much of Kuwait’s economy outside the oil 
sector proper is dependent on oil. The private sector, alongside many public business sectors, 
benefits not only from direct transfers and subsidies, but also from the overall high living 
standards of Kuwaitis and high public investment in infrastructure. For these reasons the state 
in Kuwait has been described as the prime mover of the economy (Al-Sabah 1980: 72; Ismael 
1993: 95, 105; NBK 2001–9 (2003): 19). 
Kuwait’s total population by the mid-1950s reached barely 200,000 individuals and 
grew at a rapid pace to 2.2 million by 2005. While some of this population expansion was 
due to natural growth, a large part of it was due to migration of expatriate labour to Kuwait, 
most immigrants coming on temporary work permits and visas. The percentage of Kuwaiti 
nationals both in Kuwait’s total population and in Kuwait’s workforce has declined 
substantially since the 1950s. Today 1.3 million people living in Kuwait, or more than 60 per 
cent of the population, are expatriates, primarily from Asia and other Arab countries, while 
non-Kuwaitis comprise 81 per cent of Kuwait’s workforce (see Table 1). Kuwaiti nationals 
thus constitute a minority in their own country, and their participation rate in the national 
labour force is extremely small by international standards, with only 42 per cent of the 
working age (15–64) population employed (KASA 2008: 25, Table 24).7 An important 
consequence of the dichotomy within Kuwait’s overall population is that one would expect 
the distribution of rent by the government to be aimed primarily at Kuwaiti nationals, as 
opposed to expatriates who have few legal rights and no legal claim on the country’s oil 
wealth. 
 
6 With a brief exception during the Iraqi invasion in 1990/1 as a result of the stopping of all industrial activity in 
the country. 
7 The figure of 42 per cent does not take into account those in full-time education, for which we do not have 
data. Approximately one quarter of 25–9-year-olds and 30–4-year-olds have university or postgraduate 
education. Assuming that a quarter of 15–24-year-olds are in education and removing them from the total 
population implies a participation rate of 46 per cent, still a low figure. 
6Table 1. Kuwait’s population and labour force according to nationality, 1957–2005 
Year Nationality Population % of total Labour force % of total
1957 Kuwaiti 113,622 55 24,602 30.6
Non-Kuwaiti 92,851 45 55,686 69.4
Total 206,473 100 80,288 100
1965 Kuwaiti 168,793 36.1 43,018 23.3
Non-Kuwaiti 298,546 63.9 141,279 76.7
Total 467,339 100 184,297 100
1975 Kuwaiti 307,755 30.9 91,844 30.2
Non-Kuwaiti 687,082 69.1 212,738 69.8
Total 994,837 100 304,582 100
1985 Kuwaiti 470,473 27.7 95,812 14.3
Non-Kuwaiti 1,226,828 72.3 574,573 85.7
Total 1,697,301 100 670,385 100
1995 Kuwaiti 653,616 41.5 105,189 18.4
Non-Kuwaiti 921,954 58.5 466,836 81.6
Total 1,575,570 100 572,025 100
2005 Kuwaiti 860,324 39.2 217,131 18.9
Non-Kuwaiti 1,333,324 60.8 929,245 81.1
Total 2,193,651 100 1,146,376 100
Source: KASA (1977, 1994, 2000, 2008). 
 
3. CHANNELS OF RENT DISTRIBUTION 
The primary economic question facing the Kuwaiti government is how to spend its oil 
revenues. The challenge in distributing government oil rents derives from the fact that there is 
no final consumer to whom they ‘naturally’ accrue (Segal forthcoming). In most economic 
activities the majority of value added gets distributed as wages and profits, most of which is 
then spent by the recipients in the private sector. In contrast, oil revenues flow directly into 
the treasury, and their distribution is decided by political means. When resource rents 
substitute for taxation of the private sector, as in the case of Kuwait, then individuals also 
7benefit according to how their actual tax bill compares with the counterfactual situation of the 
absence of the resource. Thus, the elimination of taxation of the private sector is not a 
distribution-neutral tax policy: if taxation in the absence of the rents would be progressive, 
then the elimination of taxes is regressive. While we cannot identify the counterfactual of 
what the economy or fiscal policy would look like without rents, we can identify the policies 
and channels used by the government to distribute oil rents.  
These channels comprise fiscal policies that determine the distribution of the current 
benefits of oil rents. But Kuwait, like a number of resource-rich countries, also saves a share 
of oil receipts in the form of a sovereign wealth fund, named the Reserve Fund for Future 
Generations (RFFG). Sovereign wealth funds are at heart also a component of distributional 
policy in that they distribute the benefits of today’s oil revenues to future generations. We 
discuss sovereign wealth funds in general and the RFFG in particular in more detail below. 
In this section we identify eight main channels through which the Kuwaiti 
government distributes rents into the wider economy. These are domestic public investment, 
land purchases, public transfer payments, subsidies, public employment, intervention in the 
private sector, the regulation of Kuwait’s FDI environment and, finally, investment abroad. It 
is important to note that some of these channels do not involve direct distribution of 
resources, but rather involve the creation of regulatory rents which benefit certain sections of 
the society. 
3.1. Domestic public investment 
Since the beginning of the 1950s, the government has invested substantially in infrastructure, 
the country’s economic diversification programme, and social services including health and 
education – which can also be seen as benefits in kind received by the population. These 
investments serve multiple purposes, all of which relate to the government’s three central 
objectives of helping diversify the economy, developing the country’s skills base and 
channelling oil revenues to the population (Ismael 1993: 135). Although the efficiency of and 
returns on some of these investment projects have been quite low, and achieving the objective 
of diversifying the economy remains elusive, public investment has been successfully used to 
benefit Kuwaiti citizens. Kuwait can look back at some important achievements in key areas 
such as literacy, education and health. This contrasts with some of the discourse in the ‘oil-
curse’ literature where it is argued that weak institutional features, such as poor governance 
8structure, a lack of accountability in government spending decisions, corruption and a lack of 
long-term planning, prevent citizens from benefiting from their oil wealth at all.  
Fighting illiteracy and building a comprehensive education system accessible to all 
Kuwaitis were among the earliest priorities for the government’s social programmes. The 
government invested heavily in the construction of schools, the hiring of rapidly increasing 
numbers of teachers – most of them from other Arab countries such as Egypt and the 
Palestinian territories, owing to a lack of Kuwaiti teachers – and literacy programmes aimed 
at the then largely illiterate population. In 1966 Kuwait University opened its doors to both 
Kuwaitis and children of expatriates living in Kuwait (Al-Sabah 1980: 57–8). Kuwait’s 
education system is still free to both Kuwaiti nationals and non-Kuwaitis, and includes free 
books, school uniforms, meals, transportation and, for low-income families, a parental 
allowance. University education includes free dormitories, meals, sportswear, transportation 
and field trips. Kuwait awards some of the Gulf’s most generous state funding to provide 
high-achieving students with scholarships to study abroad (Crystal 1995: 57). 
Expenditure on education in Kuwait has accordingly been one of the largest items on 
the government’s budget, typically representing some 5 per cent of GDP and 13 per cent of 
total government expenditure, comparable to, if not higher than, spending in high-income 
OECD countries (MBRF and UNDP/RBAS 2009: 298, Table 29; World Bank 2009). Kuwait 
has one of highest literacy rates in the MENA region – more than 94 per cent – including the 
MENA’s highest rate of literacy for women of 91 per cent, and among the region’s highest 
rates of gross school enrolment of 75 per cent (UNDP 2009: 253, Table 25; World Bank 
2009). The style and content of Kuwait’s education system have, however, been criticized 
along with those of other Arab states.8
The 1950s also marked the beginning of a comprehensive approach towards 
improving Kuwait’s formerly non-existent medical infrastructure, with medical treatment 
now being free to both nationals and expatriates. Despite criticism, particularly with regard to 
its cost, Kuwait’s health system is seen today as one of the best in the region. Where Kuwait 
does not possess the necessary medical expertise, medical treatment for Kuwaitis is paid for 
 
8 Criticism mainly concerns the mismatch between the skills of Kuwaiti graduates and the needs of the economy 
(Al-Sabah 1980: 58; Crystal 1992: 62). While much has been done by the government to encourage more 
students to study science subjects and to undertake vocational training, a report produced by MBRF and 
UNDP/RBAS (2009: 105–31) argued that many problems remain (see also the section on the labour market 
below). 
9abroad in specialist clinics, with transportation as well as accommodation costs for patients 
and their relatives paid for by the state (Crystal 1992: 62).  
Beyond these social programmes, the state also initially invested heavily in public 
infrastructure and the development of an industrial base in a state-led drive for economic 
diversification. Infrastructure in the form of roads, harbours and an airport was key to any 
future growth of economic activity outside the all-dominating oil sector. While such 
infrastructure projects were initially essential to Kuwait’s progress, the limited returns on 
government investment in the industry soon became evident. A lack of planning behind parts 
of the infrastructure development projects during the 1950s and 1960s in particular have been 
criticized (Al-Sabah 1980: 110–11). Unsuccessful cases of national companies include 
Kuwait Airways, which has been making losses for several decades, since its establishment in 
1954 (Al-Sabah 1980: 63). 
3.2. Land purchases 
A second channel for the distribution of Kuwait’s oil wealth, particularly during the 1950s 
and 1960s, was Kuwait’s land purchase programme. Despite its name, the programme was 
essentially designed as a form of transfer system with the aim of channelling the state’s 
rapidly growing rent income to the population, while also redistributing land ownership on a 
large scale (Al-Sabah 1980: 57; Khouja and Sadler 1979: 44). Under the land purchase 
programme during the 1950s and up to the 1980s, the central government bought land that 
was not in use from Kuwaiti nationals at highly inflated prices, retained some for public 
buildings, and sold the remainder back to the public at low prices. These transactions implied 
transfers of wealth to both sellers and purchasers of land. In the early 1960s, one quarter of 
total government expenditure went into the land purchase programme (Al-Sabah 1980: 57). 
The programme, however, lost its momentum during the 1980s and 1990s. Today, 
less than 3 per cent of total government expenditure is on land purchases (KASA 2008: 229, 
Table 145). The decline of the programme may have been partly due to the decline in land 
available for purchase, but it may also have been a response to severe criticism aimed at the 
programme throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Some observers objected that it was a highly 
inequitable redistribution of wealth and a major distortion of the real estate market (IBRD 
1965: 45; Al-Sabah 1980: 57; Crystal 1992: 62). A World Bank report from 1965 describes 
the land purchase programme as ‘a rather indiscriminate and inequitable way of distributing 
10 
 
the oil revenues. In addition, probably the largest share of these funds are invested abroad, so 
that the land purchase program fails to accomplish its main objective of invigorating the 
Kuwaiti economy’ (IBRD 1965: 4). Crystal argued that the main beneficiaries of the 
programme have been Kuwait’s wealthy seafaring and pearl-trading families, who 
historically owned most of the land bought by the government. In many cases, the land was 
later bought back by the same families who had sold it, resulting in large net profits for those 
families, leading essentially to ‘a transfer of wealth from the state to the rich’ (Crystal 1992: 
62). In addition, Ismael found that the programme profoundly distorted land and property 
prices, and invited large-scale property speculation (Ismael 1993: 102–4). Inflated property 
prices as well as access to land for building have remained a problem in Kuwait to this day, 
for both residents and the business sector (personal interviews, March 2010).  
3.3. Public transfer payments and pensions 
The 1950s also witnessed the beginnings of a rapidly expanding social security system based 
on transfers paid directly to Kuwaiti nationals or businesses. Initially these transfers were 
aimed primarily at poverty reduction, and were thus conditional on grounds such as low 
income, illness and disability, widowhood, divorce and unemployment. In subsequent 
decades Kuwait’s transfer system became broader, and developed into the single largest item 
on the government budget, surpassing general development expenditure and land purchase 
allocations. As can be seen from Table 2, the item ‘miscellaneous expenditure and transfers’ 
constituted 43 per cent and 59 per cent of total government expenditure in 2007/8 and 2008/9 
respectively. This category can be further broken down into miscellaneous expenditure, 
domestic transfers and external transfers. In 2008/9, domestic transfers constituted the bulk of 
this expenditure item, accounting for close to 50 per cent of total government expenditure. 
The 2008/9 figures have been inflated by the dramatic increase in transfers made to the 
pension fund in that year (discussed below). However, the 2007/8 figures still reveal the 
importance of such transfers in the Kuwaiti welfare system. In 2007/8, domestic transfers 
accounted for 25 per cent of total government expenditure, similar to the expenditure on 
wages and salaries in that year.  
Domestic transfers have evolved into a complex system of different forms of 
government support which include transfers to individuals, civil institutions and public 
institutions (which include the Public Institute for Social Security (PIFSS), the body 
11 
 
Table 2. Government expenditure (KD million), 2007/8–2008/9 
Type of expenditure 2007/8 % of total 2008/9 % of total
Wages and salaries 2,477 25.5 3,039 16.6
Goods and services 1,768 18.2 3,002 16.4
Vehicles and equipment 90 0.9 122 0.7
Projects, maintenance and land 
purchase 1,206 12.4 1,358 7.4
Miscellaneous expenditure and 
transfers 4,157 42.9 10,741 58.8
Miscellaneous expenditure 1,283 1,286
Transfers (domestic) 2,509 8,920
Transfers (external)  365 535
Total expenditure 9,698 100 18,262 100
Source: Ministry of Finance of Kuwait (2008/9). 
 
responsible for administering and paying out public pensions), general subsidies, support for 
private sector activity and businesses and support for the national labour force outside the 
public sector (see Figure 1). In 2008/9, by far the most important component of domestic 
transfers was pensions, which cost more than double the government expenditure on wages 
and salaries. In 2008/9, out of the KD10,741 million spent on miscellaneous expenditure and 
transfers, social security payments cost KD6,877 million, an enormous 38 per cent of total 
government expenditure (Ministry of Finance of Kuwait 2008/9; see Appendix B below). 
This spending is the result of many decades during which a large share of the Kuwaiti 
national workforce has been in public employment. The extent of the cost of Kuwait’s 
pensions programme prompted the unusual move by the government of levying a type of 
social insurance contribution on each national’s wage, paid by employers of Kuwaiti 
nationals (10 per cent of the wage rate with a cap at KD2,250) as well as by national 
employees (5 per cent of the monthly salary; Government of Kuwait 2010). However, 
pension payments far surpass government social insurance receipts, implying that pensions 
are not just a form of saving for individuals, deferring expenditure when young in order to 
have an income when retired, but another means for the government to transfer oil rents to 
individuals. Indeed, they clearly comprise the largest channel of rent distribution in Kuwait. 
 Other transfers to individuals comprise around 7 per cent of domestic transfers. They 
are very diverse and include annual housing loan forgiveness on the grounds of poverty or 
death, a marriage fund that enables young Kuwaiti men from low income families to pay the 
12 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of domestic transfers by various categories, 2008/9 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Kuwait (2008/9). 
 
obligatory marriage dowry, and irregular untargeted transfers. Examples include Amiri grants 
that are paid irregularly to each national at a fixed rate per head, as a kind of bonus at times 
of high oil revenues,9 and general loan forgiveness to Kuwaiti nationals, often used to write 
off capital or interest on the financing of home maintenance, holidays abroad or cars. 
Transfers to civil institutions include financial support to private education institutions, 
newspapers, clubs and unions. Though they fall into the category of general subsidies, 
payments under this heading refer to transfers made to individuals and include items such as 
extra allowances to protect households against the rising cost of living. These general 
 
9 The last time an Amiri grant was paid out to all nationals was in the fiscal year 2006/7. The grant was worth 
KD 200 per citizen, or US$690 (NBK 2006: 25; IMF 2009: 20).  
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subsidies do not include other types of subsidy such as production subsidies to the electricity 
and water sectors. These are discussed in detail in the next section.  
In the external transfers category, health services constitute the largest share, 
accounting in 2009 for 65 per cent of external transfers (Ministry of Finance of Kuwait 
2008/9: 34, Table 8). These transfers are provided for Kuwaiti nationals in need of medical 
care in foreign countries and students studying abroad. As seen in Table 2, however, external 
transfers constitute a small share of total transfers and general government expenditure. 
Figure 2 shows the share of transfers out of total household expenditure by fifteen 
income groups for Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. As seen from this graph, for Kuwaitis the 
share of transfers in total households’ expenditure does not follow a uniform pattern. It varies 
between 8 per cent and 13 per cent while the poorest group receives 15 per cent of its income 
in transfers.10 For non-Kuwaitis the picture is different. As we move up the income ladder, 
the share of transfer in total household consumption expenditure increases unevenly up to the 
eleventh expenditure group, then declines slightly for the top four groups. Thus for non-
Kuwaitis, transfers appear somewhat regressive in nature. The share of transfers out of total 
expenditure in the lowest income groups is greater for Kuwaitis, while in the higher income 
groups it is greater for non-Kuwaitis. 
It may seem surprising that the Kuwaiti government would give transfers to non-
Kuwaitis. Does it imply a ‘pure’ transfer of rent to non-Kuwaitis alone? While non-Kuwaitis 
seem to benefit from transfers, these also benefit Kuwaitis indirectly by allowing businesses 
to pay immigrant workers a lower nominal wage. The same point applies to price subsidies, 
which are also enjoyed by non-Kuwaiti residents.  
3.4. Subsidies 
The Kuwaiti government subsidizes a number of goods and services, including electricity, 
water, food and housing. The measurement of subsidies is often a contentious issue, as one 
needs to compare the price charged to domestic consumers with some measure of cost. This, 
however, is not straightforward, as there is more than one concept of cost (the average cost, 
the marginal cost and the opportunity cost) and it is not always clear which measure is used 
in the different studies.11 This can, in part, explain the large divergence in estimates of  
 
10 No Kuwaitis fall into the first income group. 
11 From an economic point of view the correct cost to use is the opportunity cost, but this is not always followed. 
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Figure 2. Share of transfers out of total expenditure by income group 
Source: Government of Kuwait (2008); authors’ own calculation. 
 
subsidies between different organizations. Furthermore, some studies tend to treat transfers 
and subsidies in the same manner, which makes comparisons across studies meaningless. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the concept of cost used, subsidies are widespread in Kuwait, with 
those for electricity being the most important followed by those for education, health and 
water. According to a World Bank study, in 2003, subsidies accounted for 20 per cent of 
GDP, though this figure includes some of the transfer payments discussed in the previous 
section (see Table 3). 
Though provision of subsidies can be seen as an additional means to distribute the oil 
rent, subsidies are highly inefficient, leading to over-use of the subsidized good or service. 
Subsidies distort the allocation of resources by diverting part of the oil total from exports 
(sold at international prices, i.e. the opportunity cost of oil) towards domestic use in power 
generation or water desalination (sold at a fraction of international prices). Subsidies can also 
be regressive, in that in many instances richer households tend to capture the bulk of them. 
Finally, subsidies are entrenched in institutional barriers and lock-in mechanisms that make it 
difficult to abolish them. This is especially true in oil-rich countries where the local 
population considers access to cheap energy as their birthright. 
Due to data limitations, this section will focus only on a few sectors were subsidies 
are highly prevalent, mainly electricity and water. According to Table 3, electricity  
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Table 3. Estimated subsidies in Kuwait (KD million), 2003 
 
Subsidy Consumption subsidies Production 
subsidies
Total 
subsidies
% of
grand 
total
Kuwaitis Expatriates Total
Electricity  157.6 127.8 285.4 139.6 425 23.8
Water  71.7 48.5 120.2 39.4 159.6 8.9
Fuel  0.3 0.2 0.5 4.4 4.9 0.3
Housing loans  126.9  126.9  126.9 7.1
Renovation 
loans  7.4  7.4  7.4 0.4
Marriage loans  8.7  8.7  8.7 0.5
Industrial loans     4.1 4.1 0.2
Government 
housing  67.5  67.5 0 67.5 3.8
Government 
plots  49.7  49.7 271.2 320.9 18
Healthcare  70.2 91.8 162  162 9.1
Education  246.2 70.5 316.7  316.7 17.7
Transportation  0.4 6.7 7  7 0.4
Communications 8.6 4.6 13.2 4.4 17.6 1
Direct 
government aid  34.5  34.5  34.5 1.9
Basic food items 5.2  5.25  2 0.3
Cleaning and 
maintenance 54.7 35.9 90.6 26.2 116.8 6.5
Grand total  909.6 386 1295.6 489.3 1784.9 100
Ratio of subsidy 
to %:  
Government 
revenues 17.4 7.4 24.7 9.3 34.1 
Government 
expenditure 22.7 9.6 32.3 12.2 44.5 
GDP 10.2 4.3 14.6 5.5 20.1 
Source: World Bank (2005: 59, Table 2.5). 
 
consumption and production subsidies amounted to KD425 million in 2003, around 6per cent 
of total government revenues during that year. All residents, both nationals and expatriates, 
enjoy subsidized electricity prices. Electricity prices for the residential sector in Kuwait are 
the cheapest in the Middle East, standing at around US 0.7 cents per kWh (see Figure 3). 
Subsidized prices are among the many factors – perhaps the most important one – that can  
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Figure 3. Residential electricity prices in selected Arab countries and the US (US¢ per kWh), 
2008 
Source: Arab Union of Producers, Transporters and Distributors of Electricity (2008); data for Kuwait from 
Eltony and Al-Awadhi (2007). 
 
explain why Kuwait has the highest electricity consumption per capita in the region (Figure 
4). 
As in the case of electricity, water tariffs are very low and do not come close to 
covering the cost of production. In 2002 the water tariff ranged between US$0.18/m3 and 
US$0.57/m3, depending on the end user, while the cost stood at around US$1.98. The 
resulting subsidy therefore amounted to about US$830 million in 2000, about 2.4 per cent of 
GDP and 5.9 per cent of oil export revenue (World Bank 2005). As seen in Table 3, both 
Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis benefit from water subsidies directly through consumption 
subsidies and indirectly through production subsidies.  
While the underlying method used to calculate water and electricity subsidies is not 
clear in Table 3 and hence one may doubt the reliability of the figures, the data on 
government revenues and expenditure can shed some light on the extent of the problem. In 
2009, the revenues from the water and electricity sectors constituted only 3.2 per cent of  
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Figure 4. Electricity consumption per capita in selected Arab countries (kWh), 2008 
Source: Arab Union of Producers, Transporters and Distributors of Electricity (2008: Table 17). 
 
government spending on these sectors. Such a large gap imposes a heavy financial cost on the 
government budget. 
In addition to electricity and water subsidies, the government provides food subsidies 
on certain basic items, such as rice, sugar and cooking oil, through the use of ration cards. 
Judging from Table 3, these subsidies are relatively small, and benefit Kuwaitis only. 
Married Kuwaitis who meet certain criteria are also entitled to housing subsidies. 
These can be used to purchase plots or houses from the National Housing Authority at prices 
well below cost, though the scheme has a long waiting list. While waiting, eligible Kuwaitis 
are entitled to rent smaller houses from the housing authority at a fraction of the market rent. 
The government also subsidizes construction material for houses built on lands purchased 
from the National Housing Authority.  
Figure 5 shows the share of housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels out of total 
households’ budget by fifteen income groups of nationals. As seen from this figure, the share 
for this category out of total expenditure does not show any significant pattern. Apart from 
the lowest income group, the shares are quite similar across the various income groups. This 
suggests that universal subsidies on electricity, water, housing and fuel will not have any  
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Figure 5. Expenditure on category out of total expenditure by income group, 2007/8 
Source: KASA; authors’ own calculations. 
 
strong distributional impact. In contrast, the share of food, beverages and tobacco in total 
expenditures declines as income rises, following Engel’s Law, with the poorest group 
spending nearly three times as much as the richest group in proportional terms. This implies 
that food subsidies are likely to be progressive.  
There are two arguments that can, in the right circumstances, be used in favour of 
subsidies. First, if the social cost of a good is lower than the private cost – for instance, if a 
positive externality implies that there is some social benefit to consuming the good that is not 
reflected in its price – then it will be efficient to provide a subsidy that brings its private cost 
or price down to the level of its social cost. In this case the subsidy will increase efficiency, 
not reduce it. Secondly, even if the subsidy is inefficient, it may be a ‘second best’ way to 
distribute income to certain groups, if direct distribution of cash is not feasible. Thus 
subsidizing low-quality foodstuffs consumed predominantly by the poor can be a way of 
reducing poverty if targeting direct transfers at the poor is difficult, as it may be since the 
poor are typically hard to identify (Cornia and Stewart 1993).  
We have just seen that food subsidies are progressive in that they benefit the poor 
proportionately more than the rich, which may justify their use. In the case of housing, water, 
electricity and other fuels, however, it appears that the subsidies have no clear distributional 
impact and tend to benefit more those households in the high income group, and hence are 
regressive. It also seems clear that there are no positive externalities associated with the 
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consumption of these goods. On the contrary, environmental considerations would suggest 
that there are negative externalities associated with the consumption of fuel and power. These 
subsidies are therefore wholly inefficient.12 
3.5. Public employment 
A job in the public sector is guaranteed to Kuwaiti nationals and comes with attractive 
salaries and benefit packages. In consequence, 91 per cent of the Kuwaiti national labour 
force works in the public sector, while 98 per cent of private sector jobs are occupied by non-
Kuwaitis (calculated from numbers from KASA 2008: 113, Table 71). Government 
expenditure on wages and salaries is typically about 20 per cent of total expenditure, the 
second largest budget item after transfers (KASA 2008: 224, Table 142).13 Wage 
discrimination between Kuwaiti nationals and expatriates further adds to the perception by 
many Kuwaitis that their job is a form of entitlement based on nationality (Al-Sabah 1980: 
116; personal interviews, March 2010).  
There is a widespread perception that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments’ 
policy of distributing rents through provision of employment in the public sector has led to 
‘overstaffed bureaucracies’ and ‘overgrown public sectors whose omnipresence in the 
economy stifles the private sector, distorted work incentives, and extreme dependence on 
governments to provide jobs [sic]’ (Eifert et al. 2003). Given that most public sector output 
does not have an observable market value and hence cannot be measured in an 
uncontroversial way, there is no straightforward way to test such claims. Nevertheless, 
evidence suggests the existence of a highly segmented Kuwaiti labour market induced by an 
implicit guarantee of employment in the government sector. Due to the substantial size of oil 
rents, the Kuwaiti government has been able to afford relatively high wages, job security, 
social allowances and generous benefits for public employees. As a result, the gap between 
 
12 One further argument for subsidies sometimes given by policy makers is that they reduce inflation. This 
argument is not, however, valid in general. A distinction has to be made between the price level and the rate of 
inflation. A subsidy lowers a given price and thereby probably lowers the overall price level, so removing a 
subsidy will result in a one-off rise in the price level. However, in the absence of other pressures, this implies 
only a one-off rise in inflation: once the subsidy has gone and the average price has risen there will be no 
continuing inflation. But though the price level has risen, the country has saved the money it was spending on 
the subsidy, and overall the country is better off. So if the price level has risen by 1 per cent then nominal 
income will have risen by more than 1 per cent. Thus this inflation-based argument for subsidies is spurious. 
13 In the fiscal year 2008/9, wages and salaries rose in absolute terms but were down to 16.6 per cent of total 
expenditure. This is due to an extraordinary increase in the government’s spending on miscellaneous 
expenditure and transfers. See also Table 2 above.  
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the private and public sector wage remains wide (especially if one takes into account the non-
wage benefits), leading to high reservation wages for Kuwaitis. Thus, there is little incentive 
for nationals to take on employment in the private sector. Unlike other countries in the GCC 
where the private sector accounts for the bulk of employment growth, the Kuwaiti public 
sector continues to be the major source of employment generation for nationals, accounting 
for more than three-fourths of employment growth in Kuwait during the period 1996–2000 
(Fasano and Rishi 2004). 
If it is true, as most observers appear to believe, that a significant share of Kuwaiti 
public sector employment is not productive, then the drawback of public employment as a 
form of rent distribution is that it prevents public sector employees from doing productive 
work in the private sector. It presents the employee with the following choice: be 
unproductive in the public sector and be rewarded with oil rents, or be productive in the 
private sector and do not be rewarded with oil rents. Moreover, beyond the immediate 
problem of currently unproductive workers, over-employment in the public sector can cause a 
failure to develop skills that would lead to growth and higher productivity. In this way, public 
employment as a form of rent distribution distorts incentives to produce, creating an 
inefficient and segmented labour market. 
The Kuwaiti government has, however, partly responded to this problem by 
subsidizing Kuwaiti labour in the private sector: KD200 million are annually channelled to 
private sector employers who employ nationals, in addition to government campaigns 
promoting the Kuwaitization of the private sector. In 2008 another KD138 million went to 
the National Labour Support programme, which subsidizes Kuwaiti nationals’ wages in the 
private sector with an average of KD180 per month, plus additional payments for spouses and 
children, adding up to the same benefits paid by the state to public sector employees (NBK 
2001–9 (2001): 9; Ministry of Finance of Kuwait 2010: Table 15; personal interviews, March 
2010). While subsidizing Kuwaitis to work in the private sector helps to reduce the distortion 
that draws them into the public sector, such subsidies may create the additional distortion of 
encouraging private sector employers to employ Kuwaitis over better-qualified non-
Kuwaitis.14 
14 This distortion would occur if employers found it cheaper to employ Kuwaitis, which would be the case if the 
wage gap between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis were smaller than the total subsidy for employing Kuwaitis. 
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3.6. Transfers to the business sector 
While employing less than 10 per cent of the Kuwaiti national labour force, Kuwait’s private 
sector employs more than 75 per cent of the country’s total labour force, including expatriates 
(KASA 2008: 113, Table 71). The private sector dominates not only services, manufacturing, 
catering, transportation and logistics, and community and social work, but also the quickly 
evolving banking and finance sectors, real estate and trade (KASA 2008: 112–13, Table 71). 
If Kuwait is to avoid having to create more unproductive public employment the private 
sector will be necessary to absorb the next generation of Kuwaitis entering the job market – 
more than half of Kuwait’s national population is below the age of 20 and will flood the job 
market in coming decades (KASA 2008: 48, Table 21). At the same time, the development of 
Kuwait’s private sector is key to Kuwait’s economic diversification strategy.15 The state has 
thus channelled large funds into the private sector in an effort to safeguard the latter’s growth. 
The government’s provision of the public infrastructure and services that business 
requires, while not charging personal or corporate income tax, is one of the principal channels 
of indirect rent distribution to the private sector.16 All sectors of the economy have benefited 
from large government expenditure on infrastructure projects including roads, electricity, 
water projects and other public works, particularly in recent years of high oil prices (NBK 
2001–9 (2007): 25). Other measures used throughout the past fifty years include technical aid 
and preferential government purchases. Low-interest or interest-free loans provided by 
institutions created by the government, such as the Industrial Bank of Kuwait, were designed 
to fund the expansion of the private sector (Crystal 1992: 52). Transfers also include bail-outs 
to private investors and institutions, the most controversial of which was during the Suq Al-
Manakh crisis of 1982.  
3.7. Foreign investment 
Foreign investment in Kuwait is highly regulated, with the aims of protecting jobs for 
Kuwaiti nationals, ensuring Kuwaiti control over natural resources, and generating additional 
rents to Kuwaiti nationals. It is important to note that FDI regulation does not involve direct 
 
15 Reiterated throughout Kuwait’s development plans, e.g. Government of Kuwait (2009: 5). 
16 Only foreign companies owned more than 50 per cent by non-nationals pay a corporate income tax, which is 
in any case negligible and is discussed below; GCC nationals are treated as Kuwaiti nationals, following GCC 
agreements. 
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distribution of resources, but rather the creation of regulatory rents which benefit certain 
sections of the society.  
Several sectors remain closed to FDI, including the emirate’s all-important 
hydrocarbon sector. Foreign ownership of companies is restricted to 40 per cent in most 
sectors, though a recent change in the law has introduced 100 per cent foreign ownership in 
some sectors (Arab Times Kuwait, 7 February 2008; NBK 2010: 28). Foreign companies 
opening business branches or wishing to import into Kuwait also need a Kuwaiti agent (NBK 
2010: 30, 35). This legal framework assures the involvement of Kuwaiti nationals as 
sponsors, agents and business partners in every business deal involving foreign investors, 
generating additional rents for Kuwaiti nationals.  
This creation of artificial barriers is inefficient and one would expect it to deter 
investment. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Kuwait’s share of FDI into the GCC has historically 
been low, and is today the lowest in the region by far. In 2008, Kuwait was able to attract 
only US$56 million, a tiny amount if compared with the GCC average of above US$10 
billion; Bahrain, the second smallest market for FDI in the GCC, by comparison attracted 
nearly US$1.8 billion (UNCTAD 2009: 249). In 2010, Kuwait ranked at number 61 out of 
183 economies in the ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index compiled by the World Bank/IFC, 
placing Kuwait far behind other GCC members such as Saudi Arabia (ranked at 13), Bahrain 
(ranked at 20) and Qatar (ranked at 39; World Bank/IFC 2010). The amended corporate tax 
law of 2008, which reduced foreign corporate tax from a 5–50 per cent range to a flat rate of 
15 per cent tax (NBK 2001–9 (2008): 34), seems to have failed in improving the foreign 
investment climate.  
More worrying for Kuwait is investors’ perception of widespread corruption in 
private and public institutions. In 2009, Kuwait dropped for a second consecutive year in the 
global corruption index produced by Transparency International, placing Kuwait at number 
66 out of 180 countries. Kuwait is currently perceived by investors to be the most corrupt 
country in the GCC. The seriousness of the problem has prompted the creation of non-
governmental organizations such as the Kuwait Transparency Society aimed at supporting 
‘the adoption and enforcement of anti-corruption legislative reforms with a view to 
eradicating all causes and manifestations of corruption’.17 
17 Kuwait News Agency, ‘Kuwait Transparency Society celebrates its fifth anniversary’, 14 March 2010. 
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While oil rents are not directly responsible for the general deterioration in the 
business environment, they may create the impression that Kuwait does not need, or does not 
feel the urgency, to improve its business and regulatory environment in order to attract 
foreign investment. 
3.8. Kuwaiti investment abroad 
While most of its distributive policies aim at channelling oil rent to various target groups, 
Kuwait was also one of the first oil-rich countries to start investing oil revenues abroad rather 
than channelling them immediately into its domestic economy. The limited absorptive 
capacity of Kuwait’s economy, due in part to the lack of potential for industrial development, 
and the prospects of higher returns for the resulting capital surplus through investment 
abroad, led the state to embark on a gradual increase of its foreign investments (Crystal 1992: 
52). At the same time, the idea of keeping money safely abroad for bad times in the future 
began to gain ground.  
The establishment of the General Reserve Fund (GRF) in 1960 was a first step that 
marked the beginnings of Kuwait’s foreign investment programme. Following the 1973 oil 
price hike and the resulting dramatic increase in revenues, Kuwait decided to lock away part 
of its annual oil revenues in the form of a Reserve Fund for Future Generations (RFFG), 
thereby ensuring the distribution of the country’s current wealth to future, potentially post-oil 
generations. In 2005, the RFFG was estimated at KD35 billion or US$114 billion (NBK 
2001–9 (2005): 34).18 In 1982, the government established the Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA), which holds stakes in big corporations such as DaimlerChrysler and BP, Citigroup 
(sold December 2009) and Merrill Lynch (sold September 2008; Financial Times, 19
November 2009, 7 December 2009). 
Sovereign wealth funds such as the RFFG have two different fundamental purposes. 
The first, as the name suggests, is to save wealth for future generations, in anticipation of the 
exhaustion of oil reserves. A resource-rich but capital-poor, low productivity and low income 
country such as Nigeria or Bolivia might find that the best way to serve future generations is 
to invest most of their savings in human and physical capital at home, if they are able to do so 
effectively. For high income countries, however, where the capital–labour ratio is high, and 
where there is already sufficient investment in education, further domestic investment is 
 
18 Kuwait’s foreign investment programme is kept off-budget and its total value is thus unknown. 
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likely to yield very low returns. In these cases, there is a strong incentive to seek higher-
yielding investments abroad.  
The second purpose of a sovereign wealth fund is to act as a ‘stabilization fund’ to 
smooth incomes to oil producers in the face of highly volatile prices. Typical commodity 
stabilization funds smooth government expenditures by taking a view on the long-run price of 
the commodity, with government expenditures kept at the sustainable level, estimated on the 
basis of predicted long-run average income. Such funds have a poor track record globally, 
however, because it is very difficult to estimate the long-run price correctly. In addition to 
this technical challenge, governments in need of finance have an incentive to over-estimate 
the long-run price in order to justify extracting funds in the short run, leading to unsustainable 
expenditures and long-run indebtedness. In the case of Kuwait, however, the fact that the 
country is saving so much wealth, in addition to attempting to smooth its income, implies that 
it is very unlikely to suffer from this problem.  
4. ASSESSMENT 
4.1. Oil rents and living standards 
What is the net effect of the complex system of transfers described above? We find no 
explicit targeting, and in particular there appears to be no effort to direct social benefits 
specifically at the poor. Unlike in countries that do not have large resource incomes, in 
Kuwait social benefits and other transfers distribute income, but they do not redistribute it: 
they are financed from oil rather than by taxing individuals or businesses. The role of the 
fiscal system is thus not to adjust an existing distribution of income but, rather, to ensure that 
all Kuwaitis gain from oil rents.  
The net effect appears to be a very egalitarian distribution in the economy, as 
indicated in household expenditure survey data presented in the government’s Annual 
Statistical Abstract. On the basis of these data we estimate a Gini coefficient of 21.8 for the 
Kuwaiti national population alone. This is an exceptionally low level of inequality, lower, 
indeed, than any recently recorded Gini coefficient for any whole country.19 For the whole 
population we estimate a Gini coefficient of 28.0, also a very low level of inequality and 
similar to that of the egalitarian northern European countries such as Germany. However, the 
 
19 Going back to 2000, no national Gini coefficient this low is reported in the United Nations University’s World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID, available at www.wider.unu.edu/wiid). 
25 
 
household survey data are problematic: they imply a level of aggregate household 
consumption that is only 42 per cent of that reported in national accounts data, and in our 
view the above are likely to be under-estimates of the true level of inequality (Anand and 
Segal 2008). We discuss this issue further in Appendix A. 
The shortcomings of the data make it difficult to estimate the level of poverty in 
Kuwait. Since Kuwait does not report an official poverty line, we employ a US-based poverty 
line as used by the OECD (2008b: 152), which is US$8,087 per capita. If we take the 
household survey data at face value, then, we find that 27 per cent of Kuwaitis and 58 per 
cent of non-Kuwaitis live below this poverty line. If we scale up the survey-reported 
expenditures so that household consumption equals that reported in the national accounts, 
then no Kuwaitis, and only 6 per cent of non-Kuwaitis, live below this poverty line. The 
widths of these ranges reflect the inconsistencies in the data (see Appendix A). 
Beyond the share living below a poverty line, we can also use household survey data 
to investigate how well household expenditures reflect the magnitude of oil rents. We 
estimate adjusted per capita oil rents for consumption of KD9,634, while mean per capita 
expenditure in the household survey is KD2,856. According to the data, it appears that most, 
if not all, Kuwaitis are consuming much less than per capita oil rents. Where is the money 
going? Households save some share of their incomes, and if this share is large then their 
expenditures would be substantially lower than their incomes. It is highly unlikely, however, 
that they would save more than two-thirds of their incomes on average. It is also possible that 
the survey data are broadly correct except for the very top of the distribution, in which case 
there may be a very small share of Kuwaitis, who do not take part in the survey, who receive 
the lion’s share of the oil rents. If this is the case then Kuwait is far more unequal than the 
data suggest and we cannot rule out the possibility that the majority of Kuwaitis are not 
benefiting from their oil to the extent that they should.  
There is a further puzzle in the Kuwaiti data. While the economy has grown in recent 
years, household expenditure has not. Household final consumption expenditure (HFCE) has 
fallen from a range of 40–50 per cent over 2000–3 to around 30 per cent over 2005–7 – 
compared to about 70 per cent in the US, and between 40 and 46 per cent in Norway. In fact, 
while per capita GDP in Kuwait rose by 38 per cent over 2002–6, HFCE fell absolutely by 21 
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per cent.20 The extra income appears to have been saved abroad through the large current 
account surplus discussed above. But while the precautionary saving of windfall income due 
to high oil prices is sensible, we can find no reason to save so much that current consumption 
actually declines as oil prices rise. We are inclined, therefore, to be sceptical of these national 
accounts data, but we have no satisfactory explanation for this finding. 
4.2. Distortions and inefficiencies 
An advantage of taxing oil rather than the population is that it is not economically 
distortionary. However, we have seen that Kuwait’s government expenditures typically are 
distortionary. Subsidies to utilities are highly inefficient, leading to over-use of the subsidized 
good or service. Kuwait’s system of general loan forgiveness has been criticized for 
rewarding risky expenditure on unnecessary goods (e.g. Wall Street Journal, 4 November 
2005). We have also seen that public employment as a means of rent distribution distorts the 
labour market, discouraging Kuwaitis from taking up potentially more productive jobs in the 
private sector. All of these inefficiencies derive from the basic fact that, when the goal is the 
distribution of rents to citizens, any attempt to achieve it through indirect distribution policies 
will end up distorting people’s incentives in one way or another. In addition to these 
inefficient expenditures the government also creates artificial barriers to foreign investment 
into Kuwait, deterring such investment and potentially reducing longer-run growth. 
While there are numerous sources of inefficiency in official policies, we have not 
found evidence of ‘rent-seeking behaviour’ as discussed in the development economics 
literature.21 According to this literature such behaviour involves individuals devoting their 
energies to extracting as large a share of pre-existing rents as possible, instead of engaging in 
productive activities. In Kuwait the diversion of otherwise productive individuals into 
unproductive activities would seem to be caused primarily by official policies and distorted 
incentives, including public over-employment, rather than efforts by individuals. While 
distorted incentives and inefficient policies are shaped in part by oil rents, they seem to 
reflect broader social, political and institutional factors.  
 
20 World Development Indicators online, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators, 
accessed April 2010. 
21 See Krueger (1974), Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1993). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the middle of the twentieth century Kuwait has successfully used its oil revenues to 
improve the living standards of its people. While data problems preclude firm conclusions, it 
seems reasonably clear that all Kuwaitis enjoy substantial benefits from their oil. They 
receive generous public services, in addition to a variety of mechanisms that distribute oil 
income among the population. While many benefits are aimed at Kuwaitis alone, Kuwait’s 
oil wealth has attracted large numbers of immigrants who enjoy, at least, the employment 
opportunities it creates. 
The role of the distributive system is not to adjust an existing distribution of income 
but, rather, to ensure that all Kuwaitis gain from oil rents. Hence, some of the distribution 
channels such as subsidizing utilities are regressive in nature in the sense that rich households 
tend to benefit relatively more than poor households from these subsidies. There is no 
taxation system to reverse some of these effects. Yet our very tentative findings suggest a 
relatively egalitarian economic structure in Kuwait. Such findings may be the result of errors 
in national accounts data. Alternatively, it is possible that other channels of rent distribution 
(such as private transfers) offset some of the regressive elements associated with subsidies.  
One of the largest mechanisms for distributing oil income is public employment, and 
this also implies perhaps the largest distortion of the economy. Since Kuwaitis have the right 
to public employment, it appears that some jobs are created simply to fulfil this right, rather 
than to provide any useful service. From the point of view of economic efficiency, it would 
be preferable to give all Kuwaitis a direct payment from oil revenues independently of where 
they work. Without the disincentive to work in the private sector, Kuwait might be more 
likely to achieve the economic diversification that it desires. Another clear source of 
economic inefficiency is the provision of subsidies to utilities, especially electricity and 
water. These subsidies not only make Kuwaitis worse off in aggregate, but, by increasing 
Kuwaiti consumption of energy, also contribute to the country’s huge and rapidly rising 
energy consumption, and resulting carbon emissions. 
Kuwait should therefore be considered broadly a success story. It has certainly 
avoided the perils that some resource-rich countries have faced, and oil has unquestionably 
improved the lives of Kuwaitis. Nevertheless, some of Kuwait’s policies of rent distribution, 
such as subsidizing utilities and providing public employment, have resulted in substantial 
distortions, inefficiencies and institutional deficiencies, and thus there remains considerable 
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scope for improvement. One area of improvement could be the abolition of subsidies. 
Individuals would be better off if the government raised the price of utilities to their marginal 
cost and the revenues resulting from eliminating the subsidy were directly given to 
consumers through cash transfers. Given Kuwait’s extensive distributive system and the fact 
that the bulk of Kuwaitis are employed in the public sector, this policy could be implemented 
at a low cost.  
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND OIL RENTS IN KUWAIT 
Estimating the distribution of income 
Household survey data for Kuwait present the population broken down into fifteen 
expenditure groups (KASA: 272–3, Table 164), within which the population is further 
divided into Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. We use the program Povcal22 to fit a Lorenz curve 
to the data and to estimate inequality. Povcal estimates Lorenz curves using the Generalized 
Quadratic (GQ) method and the Beta method (Datt 1998); when both estimates are valid, it 
chooses the curve with the better fit. 
There are, however, several problems with the survey data. First, the populations 
within the fifteen groups are very unbalanced: there are no Kuwaitis in the poorest group, 
while the top group contains 22 per cent of the Kuwaiti population (8 per cent of the total 
population). Non-Kuwaitis are represented in all fifteen groups, but the top eight groups 
combined contain only 6 per cent of the non-Kuwaiti population, while the third from bottom 
contains 28 per cent and the second from bottom 22 per cent. 
Secondly, the entries given for the ‘total’ population are problematic. They simply 
add together the number of Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti households and individuals in each 
expenditure group, so that, for instance, the top expenditure group contains 2,928 Kuwaiti 
individuals and 58 non-Kuwaiti individuals, with the ‘total’ entry reporting 2,986 individuals. 
Thus each Kuwaiti in the survey is given the same weight as each non-Kuwaiti . This gives 
incorrect aggregates because the ratio of Kuwaiti individuals to non-Kuwaiti individuals in 
the survey is 13,612/11,303 = 1.20, while the ratio in the actual population is 0.65. In our 
calculations we multiply the share of Kuwaitis in a given expenditure group by the share of 
Kuwaitis in the population, and similarly for non-Kuwaitis, in order to achieve the correct 
aggregates. 
Thirdly, the data are ordered by total household income, not per capita household 
income. We simply assume that this provides the same ordering, implicitly assuming that 
household size does not correlate with expenditure. We attempted to get hold of the original 
data but received no reply from the Kuwaiti Central Statistical Office. 
Fourthly, as reported in the text, probably the most important problem is that total 
household expenditure implied by the household survey data is only 42 per cent of the level 
reported in the national accounts. In most countries household consumption is lower when 
measured in household surveys than in national accounts, but Deaton (2005) finds that the 
average ratio is 86 per cent – more than double that in Kuwait. In Kuwait’s survey data total 
household expenditure is KD4.6 billion for the year October 2007 to September 2008, while 
the national accounts estimate of Private Consumption Expenditure, which is very close in 
concept (and which we take to mean the same thing as HFCE),23 is KD11.0 billion for 2008.  
One likely part of the explanation is that the rich tend to be under-sampled: data 
collectors for household surveys are unlikely to make it past the mansion gates. If this is the 
reason why the survey fails to capture more than half of private expenditure, and the 
 
22 Povcal was written by Shaohua Chen, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion and can be downloaded from 
http://go.worldbank.org/YMRH2NT5V0. 
23 See Anand and Segal (2008) for discussion of the relationship between national accounts and survey estimates 
of consumption. 
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expenditures of the rest of the population are not under-estimated by any large amount, then it 
implies that inequality will also be greatly under-estimated. For this reason we suspect that 
the estimated Gini of 28.0 is lower than the true value.  
On the other hand it is possible that all expenditures, including those lower down the 
distribution, are under-estimated. If they are uniformly under-estimated then inequality will 
not be affected but poverty levels will be. As explained in the text, since Kuwait does not 
report an official poverty line we employ a US-based poverty line as used by the OECD 
(2008b: 152), of US$8,087 per capita,24 which we convert into Kuwaiti dinars using the PPP 
exchange rate. If we take data straight from the survey, 26.6 per cent of Kuwaitis and 58.4 
per cent of non-Kuwaitis live below this poverty line. If we scale all expenditures up to the 
level estimate in national accounts, multiplying them all by 1/0.42 = 2.38, then less than 1 per 
cent of Kuwaitis and 6.1 per cent of non-Kuwaitis live below the poverty line. 
Estimating per capita oil rents 
In estimating the extent to which household expenditure reflects the magnitude of oil rents, 
there are two reasons why we cannot simply compare household expenditure with per capita 
oil revenues to the government. First, as we have seen, the government saves a large share of 
its revenues in the form of the RFFG. These savings are intended to benefit Kuwaitis in the 
future rather than today. To account for this we can take government expenditure, as opposed 
to government income due to oil rent, as our measure of the quantity of oil rents that we 
should expect Kuwaitis to be currently benefiting from. This makes a very big difference: in 
2007/8 government income from oil was KD17.7 billion while government expenditure was 
KD9.7 billion. 
Secondly, some government expenditures are in kind, including subsidies and health 
and education services, which benefit households without appearing in survey data as 
household expenditures. We therefore exclude government expenditures on subsidies and 
services from the amount of rent that should appear as household private expenditures. We 
identify four categories as those that we expect to provide in-kind benefits to households: 
transfers to civil institutions, general subsidies, education and research, and health services. 
These comprised 7.2 per cent of government expenditures in 2008/9. Subtracting this share 
from government expenditure in 2007/8 gives KD9.0 billion, or KD9,634 per Kuwaiti, which 
we refer to as ‘adjusted per capita oil rents’. 
 
24This line is defined as 60 per cent of median US household consumption for a four-person household, which is 
US$32,388. The OECD poverty lines are based on equivalence scales, so the per capita income poverty line 
depends on the number of individuals in the household. We use the four-person household poverty line because 
it is the largest household size whose poverty line is reported, while in the survey data Kuwaiti households have 
on average 8.6 individuals and non-Kuwaiti households have 5.2. The Kuwaiti data do not, as far as we know, 
use any equivalence scales. The application of this poverty line is therefore imprecise. 
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APPENDIX B: MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE AND TRANSFERS (KD MILLION), 2008/9 
 
2008/9 As a % 
Public services 851.06 7.9
Services to organizations  521.26 4.9 
Financial services  43.76 0.4 
Security and justice  119.67 1.1 
Foreign expenditure  166.37 1.5 
Defence  953.03 8.9
Social services 7,755.44 72.2
Education  530.38 4.9 
Health  347.79 3.2 
Social security payments 6,877.27 64.0 
Public services 370.64 3.5
Information  32.95 0.3 
Religion  7.83 0.1
Residential  201.80 1.9 
Public facilities  128.07 1.2 
Economic services 344.14 3.2
Mining and quarrying  254.26 2.4 
Transport  0.37
Communication  0.74
Electricity and water  1.21
Trade and industry  2.90
Agriculture and fishery  84.66 0.8 
Other  467.09 4.3
Total 10,741.39 100.0
Source: Ministry of Finance of Kuwait (2008/9: 40). 
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